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CASENOTES
NEWSPAPER WINS COURT ACCESS BUT LOSES BY A
QUALIFYING MARGIN
Extra! Extra! Read all about it! High court grants newspaper
right of access to preliminary criminal proceedings. Wins but
loses.
These headlines could have been shouted by a street-corner newsboy
after the United States Supreme Court held recently that the public has a
qualified First Amendment right of access to preliminary criminal hear-
ings as they are conducted in California. Access to such proceedings has
been a concern of the press and media for some time. In Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court' ("Press-Enterprise"), the newspaper, The Press-
Enterprise, ("newspaper") challenged the California Superior Court's de-
nial of access to the transcript from a preliminary hearing. The Court
granted certiorari and made a seemingly favorable ruling, but because it
held this right was qualified, the newspaper may not have received the
result for which it had hoped.
FACTS: THE INSIDE STORY
Robert Diaz, a nurse, was charged with the murder of twelve pa-
tients by administering massive doses of the heart drug, lidocaine. The
State of California sought the death penalty in a complaint filed on De-
cember 23, 1981, in the Riverside Municipal Court. Diaz moved to ex-
clude the public from the preliminary hearing scheduled for July 6, 1982,
citing California Penal Code section 868,2 which requires the proceedings
I. -U.S.-., 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West 1985). This section, as amended in 1982, provides in
full:
The examination shall be open and public. However, upon the request of the
defendant and a finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the public is necessary in
order to protect the defendant's rights to a fair and impartial trial, the magistrate
shall exclude from the examination every person except the clerk, court reporter and
bailiff, the prosecutor and his or her counsel, the Attorney General, the district attor-
ney of the county, the investigating officer, the officer having custody of a prisoner
witness while the witness is testifying, the defendant in custody and a person chosen
by the prosecuting witness who is not himself or herself a witness but who is present
to provide the prosecuting witness with moral support, provided that the person so
chosen shall not discuss prior to or during the preliminary examination the testimony
of the prosecuting witness with any person, other than the prosecuting witness, who
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to be open unless closure is necessary to protect the defendant's right to a
fair and impartial trial. The court granted the unopposed motion be-
cause the case had attracted national publicity and the court felt closure
was necessary to prevent the possibility of one-sided reporting by the me-
dia. Upon the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, which lasted forty-
one days,3 the newspaper requested the release of the transcript of the
proceedings. The court denied this request and sealed the record.
On January 21, 1983, the State moved in superior court4 to have the
transcripts of the preliminary hearing released to the public. The news-
paper joined the State in support of this motion. Diaz opposed the mo-
tion claiming that prejudicial pretrial publicity would result if the
transcripts were released. The superior court denied the motion finding
that there was a "reasonable likelihood that release of all or any part of
the transcript might prejudice defendant's right to a fair and impartial
trial."
5
The newspaper then filed a preemptory writ of mandate with the
California Court of Appeal. The writ was originally denied, but was
later set for hearing upon order by the California Supreme Court.6 In
the interim, Diaz waived his right to a jury trial and the superior court
released the transcript. The court of appeal, after holding the contro-
versy was not moot, denied the writ of mandate.7
The California Supreme Court also denied the newspaper its pre-
emptory writ of mandate, holding that the First Amendment does not
provide a general right of public access to preliminary hearings. The
court based its holding on two grounds. First, the court concluded that
the right of access to criminal proceedings was limited to actual criminal
trials and not preliminary hearings. Second, the court recognized the
is a witness in the examination. Nothing in this section shall affect the right to ex-
clude witnesses as provided in Section 687 of the Penal Code.
Id.
3. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2738. The State presented testimony and evidence at the
preliminary hearing which was primarily medical and scientific. The remaining evidence was
comprised of testimony by the defendant's co-workers who had worked with him during the
shifts when the twelve patients died. Although defense counsel vigorously cross-examined
most of the witnesses, no evidence was introduced on behalf of the defendant and he was held
to answer on all charges. Id.
4. In California, criminal charges are filed in municipal court and the preliminary hear-
ing is held there. If sufficient evidence is presented to warrant a trial, then the prosecution will
move to superior court for purposes of trial.
5. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2739.
6. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986). A peremptory writ of mandate, if issued by
the court as requested, would effectively order the superior court to release the transcript to
the newspaper. Id.
7. Id. at 2739.
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defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial by an unbiased jury, unin-
fluenced by information obtained through news accounts of the
proceedings.'
After finding that the public had no general First Amendment right
of access to preliminary hearings, the California Supreme Court consid-
ered those circumstances in which closure would be proper under the
California access statute, California Penal Code section 868.' The court
concluded that, under this statute, if the defendant is able to establish a
reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice, the burden shifts to the
prosecution or the media to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that there is no reasonable probability that the defendant's rights will be
prejudiced. '
The newspaper appealed to the United States Supreme Court which
granted certiorari to consider the issue of whether the superior court
erred in failing to release the transcript of the preliminary hearing upon
the newspaper's original request for these transcripts." The newspaper
pursued the appeal even though they had already obtained the sought
after transcipts. The newspaper wanted its rights determined because of
the likelihood of similar closure situations arising in the future. For this
reason, the Court concluded that the issue of access was not moot and
addressed the merits of the case. 2
THE COURT'S REASONING
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, holding that the standard applied by the Califor-
nia court failed to consider the First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings. The California Supreme Court had concluded that
the magistrate must close the preliminary hearing upon finding a "rea-
sonable likelihood of substantial prejudice which would impinge upon
8. Id. Accord Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West 1985).
10. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2739.
11. Id.
12. Id. The United States Supreme Court was willing to hear this appeal even though the
issue was effectively moot since the transcript of the preliminary hearing had been released to
the newspaper. Under an exception to the general mootness rule, an appellant will have stand-
ing to appeal if the Court recognizes that this controvery is "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982); Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 377 (1979). In Press-Enterprise, the Court found that it is reason-
able to assume that the newspaper will be subjected to a similar closure order which is likely to
evade review because criminal proceedings are typically of short duration. Id.
1988]
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the right to a fair trial."' 3 Further, the court had found that Penal Code
section 868 clearly indicates that the primary right is that of a fair trial
and that the public's right of access must yield when these rights are in
conflict. 14
The Court found it difficult to disagree with the California Supreme
Court's analysis, which balanced Diaz's right to a fair trial against the
public's right of access to the proceeding. However, the Court hastened
to assert that these rights are not necessarily inconsistent. The Court
reasoned that Diaz, or any criminal defendant, does have a right to a fair
and impartial trial. However, the Court has also recognized on numer-
ous occasions that having the proceedings open to neutral observers is an
important aspect of assuring that the defendant receives a fair and impar-
tial proceeding.I5 In addition, the right to an open proceeding is shared
between the accused and the public since each has a common concern in
assuring fairness in the process.16 The Court concluded that there is a
presumption favoring open criminal proceedings.' 7
The newpaper asserted that the right of the public to attend criminal
hearings is implicit in the First Amendment. The California Supreme
Court concluded that the First Amendment was not applicable here be-
cause the proceeding was a preliminary hearing and not an actual trial.'"
The United States Supreme Court found that the First Amendment issue
cannot be resolved merely by looking at the name given to the event,
especially because the preliminary hearing in a criminal proceeding oper-
ates much like a full scale trial. '9
The Court noted that cases dealing with the First Amendment right
of access to criminal proceedings emphasized two complementary con-
siderations.2" First, courts have considered whether the place and pro-
cess have historically been open to the press and general public.2 '
Second, the courts have considered whether public access plays a signifi-
cant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in ques-
tion.22 These criteria have been referred to as experience and logic,
13. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2739.
14. Id.
15. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
16. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2740.
17. Id.
18. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 772, 776, 209 Cal. Rptr. 360, 362,
691 P.2d 1026, 1028 (1984).
19. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2741.
20. Id. at 2740.
21. Id. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982).
22. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
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respectively. If the particular proceeding in question satisfies these two
criteria, then a qualified First Amendment right of public access
attaches.2"
The Court cautioned that although open proceedings give assur-
ances of fairness to the accused and public, there are some limited cir-
cumstances in which the accused's right of a fair and impartial trial may
be compromised by publicity.2 4 Under such circumstances, the trial
court must determine if the rights of the accused outweigh the qualified
First Amendment right of access. The presumption of an open proceed-
ing is only overcome "by an overriding interest based on finding that
closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest."2 5 Furthermore, it is essential that the trial court
sufficiently articulate this interest along with specific findings such that a
reviewing court is able to determine whether the closure order was prop-
erly entered under those particular circumstances.
The Court noted further that if the interest asserted by the moving
party is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing
shall be closed only on the demonstration of the following specific find-
ings. First, it must be shown that there is a substantial probability that
the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity which
closure would prevent. Second, there must not be any reasonable alter-
natives to closure which could adequately protect the defendant's right to
a fair trial.26
The Court observed that the California Supreme Court required the
magistrate to close the preliminary hearing upon finding a reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice.2 7 This "reasonable likelihood" stan-
dard places a lesser burden on the defendant than did the "substantial
probability" test which the Court held is required by the First Amend-
ment.2" In addition, the California Supreme Court failed to consider any
alternatives other than complete closure, which could have protected the
defendant's rights.2 9
23. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2740.
24. Id. at 2741. Closure may be justified where interests other than that of the accused are
present. For example, victims of sex crimes, likely to be subjected to trauma and embarrass-
ment, may be protected by closure. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982).
25. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2741. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,
464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
26. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2743.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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The Court asserted that closure of an entire forty-one day proceed-
ing would rarely be warranted. This is because the First Amendment
right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory assertion that pub-
licity might deprive the defendant of the right to a fair trial. Any limita-
tion must be narrowly drawn to serve the particular interest involved.3"
The complete closure of such a lengthy proceeding would arguably not
be considered narrowly drawn because all portions of the proceeding are
eliminated rather than just those portions which will affect the defend-
ant's rights to a fair trial.
The United States Supreme Court applied the two criteria set forth
above, experience and logic, and concluded that a right of public access
applies to preliminary hearings as conducted in California.3 First, in
analyzing the historical perspective, the Court fiund that there has been
a tradition of accessibility to the preliminary hearings as conducted in
California.32
Second, the Court addressed the question of whether public access
to preliminary hearings as conducted in California plays a particularly
significant role in the actual functioning of the process. The Court con-
cluded that public access to criminal trials, as well as the selection of the
jury, is essential to the proper functioning of the California criminal jus-
tice system. In addition, the Court found that preliminary hearings in
California are sufficiently similar to a trial to justify the same conclu-
sion.3 3 The Court noted further that because of the extensive scope of
the preliminary hearing, it is often the final and most important step in
the criminal process.34 In many cases, the preliminary hearing may pro-
vide the only occasion for the public to observe the criminal justice
system.35
The Court concluded further that because the jury is absent in a
preliminary hearing, this underscores the importance of public attend-
30. Id. at 2744.
31. Id. at 2741.
32. Id. Grand jury proceedings have traditionally been closed to the public and the ac-
cused. However, the near uniform practice of state and federal courts has been to conduct
preliminary hearings in open court. Id.
33. Id. at 2742. The accused has an absolute right to an elaborate preliminary hearing
before a neutral magistrate. He has the right to personally appear at the proceeding, to be
represented by an attorney, to cross-examine hostile witnesses, to present exculpatory evi-
dence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence. If the magistrate finds that probable cause
exists, the accused is bound over for trial. See also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 859-66 (West 1985),
§ 1538.5 (West 1982).
34. Often plea bargaining takes place which eliminates the defendant from going through
with the full trial.
35. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2743.
[Vol. 8
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ance. a6 The jury has long been recognized as an important safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and a possibly biased or
eccentric judge, thus making the importance of public access even more
significant."a
Further benefits from open proceedings noted by the Court were
termed the "community therapeutic value of openness.""a The Court ex-
plained that criminal acts, especially violent crimes, provoke public con-
cern, outrage and hostility. The public's access to criminal proceedings
provides an outlet for reactions and emotions when the public actually
sees the law enforced through the operation of our criminal justice sys-
tem. 9 In addition, the fact that anyone can attend provides assurance
that established procedures are being followed and any deviation from
these standards will be revealed. Furthermore, people not attending can
be confident that standards of fairness are being followed, which are es-
sential to public confidence in the system overall."°
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Open Court Proceedings
The origin of criminal proceedings and their traditional openness
has a strong and lengthy historical background.41 Prior to the Norman
Conquest, cases in England were usually brought before "moots" which
were attended by the freemen of the community.42 This was somewhat
comparable to modern jury duty. Attendance by the freemen at these
meetings was mandatory since they were called upon to render judg-
ment.43 As the jury system gradually evolved, the mandatory duty for
freemen to be present at the trial and render decisions became more leni-
ent, but there is no indication that criminal proceedings did not remain
public. 44
There have been many changes in the courts and their procedures
through the years, but the public aspect of the trial which decided guilt
or innocence remained unaffected. Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565
36. Id.
37. Id. See, e.g., Duncan v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1986).
38. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2743.
39. Id. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980).
40. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2743. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572.
41. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564.
42. Id. at 565. See, e.g., F. POLLOCK, ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE NORMAN CONQUEST
IN 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 88, 89 (1907).
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 599 (5th ed. 1979). A freeman is defined as "a person not
in slavery or serfdom; one who possessed the rights or privileges of a citizen." Id.
44. Id. See, e.g., W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 12 (1927).
1988]
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about definitive proceedings in criminal matters, stressed that although
the indictment was put in writing, the rest was done openly in the pres-
ence of the judges, the accused, and all others that could come to hear all
depositions and testifying witnesses.45
One of the most prominent characteristics of the English judicial
system existing as a rule throughout its history, is that all judicial trials
are held in open court with the public having unrestricted access.4 6 In
addition, there are no indications that openness was not carried over as a
characteristic of the colonial American judicial system. Records from
early criminal trials in Virginia indicate that they were open to the pub-
lic. In addition, in the mid-1600's, when the Virginia Assembly felt a
lack of respect and decorum for the courts by those in attendance, they
promulgated rules prescribing certain conduct rather than limit public
access.
47
In the 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, pub-
lic access to courts in criminal proceedings was explicitly recognized as a
fundamental law of the Colony.48 In addition, the Pennsylvania Frame
of Government of 1682 provided for courts open to the public which was
reaffirmed in section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution adopted in
1776. 49 Such historical evidence conclusively demonstrates that at the
time United States fundamental laws were adopted, criminal trials had
long been deliberately opened to the public.50
Despite the fact that the history of open criminal trials goes back
long before the Constitution was adopted, neither the Constitution, nor
the Bill of Rights contains any specific language or provision which guar-
antees the public's right to attend criminal proceedings.5 However, the
United States Supreme Court has held repeatedly that there is an implicit
First Amendment right of the public to attend criminal proceedings ab-
sent an overriding interest of the defendant articulated in the trial court's
findings.5 2 Without this right, exercised for centuries, important aspects
of other rights, such as freedom of speech and of the press, could be
45. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 566. See, e.g., T. SMITH, DE REPUBLICA AN-
GLORUM 101 (Alston ed. 1972).
46. Id. See, e.g., F. POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 31-32 (1904); E.
JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967).
47. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 567.
48. Id. See REPRINTED IN SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry ed. 1959); 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 129 (1971).
49. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 568. See, e.g., 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 271 (1971).
50. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569.
51. Id. at 575.
52. Id. at 580.
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eviscerated.53
Open Pretrial Proceedings
There is substantial evidence indicating that there was no common
law right of the public to attend pretrial proceedings.54 By the time the
Constitution was adopted, public trials were clearly associated with the
protection of the defendant to obtain a fair trial. After the Star Chamber
was abolished in 1641, criminal defendants began to acquire many of the
rights presently enumerated in the Sixth Amendment.55 These rights in-
clude the right to confront witnesses, to call witnesses on one's own be-
half, and the right to a fair trial as it is presently known. It was during
this time that the public trial became identified as a right of the accused
which a defendant could demand. However, pretrial proceedings were
never characterized with the same degree of openness as actual trials be-
cause of the concern for fairness.
5 6
Under English common law, the public did not have the right to
attend pretrial proceedings.57 The courts were aware of the possible dele-
terious effects from the publication of information prior to either the in-
dictment or the actual trial.58
Although the Framers could not anticipate contemporary pretrial
proceedings such as motions to supress evidence, pretrial proceedings
were not completely unknown at the time the Constitution was written.
For example, written interrogatories were used in pretrial 18th century
litigation, most notably in admiralty cases.59 Thus, it appears that the
drafters of the Sixth Amendment were aware that testimony could be
recorded prior to the actual trial, but there was still no suggestion of the
right of the public to be present at pretrial proceedings.6°
Openness at pretrial hearings however was soon noted in history. In
53. Id. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
54. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 (1979).
55. Id. at 387 n.18. See e.g. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (5th ed. 1979). The Star
Chamber was a court which originally had jurisdiction over cases where judicial procedure
was substantially obstructed by one party through writs, or strong influence so that the inferior
courts could not have its process obeyed. In the reign of Henry VIII and his successors, the
jurisdiction of the court was extended illegally to such an extent (notably in punishing those
disobedient to the King's arbitrary proclamations) that it became repugnant to the nation and
was abolished. Id.
56. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 387.
57. Id. at 389.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 396.
60. Id. In fact, until the trial, it was not known whether any pretrial or other evidence
would be offered or received during the trial. Id.
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1807, prior to the trial of Aaron Burr for treason, with Chief Justice Mar-
shall sitting as trial judge, the probable cause hearing was held. We
know that this was an open proceeding because reports note that the
courtroom was allegedly too small to accomodate the crush of interested
citizens.61 In addition, the original New York Field Code of Criminal
Procedure, adopted in 1850, provided that pretrial hearings should be
closed to the public if requested by the defendant.62 This was designed to
protect the accused from prejudicial pretrial publicity. Eight states still
have the explicit provision relating to closed pretrial hearings.63 From
the Burr trial until the present day, it has been the nearly uniform prac-
tice of state and federal courts to conduct preliminary hearings in open
court. 64
ANALYSIS: Is THIS WHAT THE NEWSPAPER WANTED?
Press-Enterprise Company pursued this action to the level of the
United States Supreme Court even though it received the requested tran-
scripts prior to the appeal. The newspaper was attempting to establish its
rights in an effort to circumvent future problems likely to arise. The
Court could have held that the issue was moot because the newpaper had
already received the transcripts. However, it granted certiorari recogniz-
ing that there was a reasonable likelihood that the newspaper would be
subjected to future closure orders.65
At first glance, it appears that the newspaper prevailed in its action
since the Court reversed the California Supreme Court's decision and
held that there was a First Amendment right of access applicable to pre-
liminary hearings. However, the Court specifically stated that this right
is qualified. More specifically, this right is not absolute and the court
may be closed if the accused prevails in convincing the court that closure
is necessary. Therefore, by qualifying this right, the newspaper has not
actually prevailed, because it still must contest motions for closure,
which it was trying to avoid. The newspaper arguably wanted a declara-
tion of an absolute right in order to expeditiously thwart any closure
attempts. This determination was not obtained.
61. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct 2735, 2741 (1986).
62. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 403. See, e.g., COMMISSIONS IN PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS,
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 202 (Final Report 1850).
63. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 391 n.3. See ARIz. RULE CRIM. PROC. 9.3; CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 868 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 19-811 (1979); IOWA CODE § 761.13 (1973); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-10-201 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171,204 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-14
(1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-13 (1978).
64. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2741.
65. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Another reason that the newspaper did not prevail was that this de-
cision fails to directly address the issue which the newspaper presented to
the court. This issue was whether the newspaper had a right to the trans-
cipts in this particular case at the time they were first requested. In other
words, whether the accused's rights outweigh the public's right of access
in this case. The Court presented its criteria for balancing these interests
but failed to apply it to the facts of this case.
The dissent recognized another version of the issue presented-
whether the public has a First Amendment right to insist upon access to
the transcript of a preliminary hearing prior to trial, even though the
accused, the prosecutor and the trial judge have all agreed to seal the
transcript in order to assure a fair trial.66 The Supreme Court previously
addressed this issue in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.67 In that case, the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment confers the right to a public trial
only upon the defendant, not to the press or public.6" The Court in Gan-
nett pointed out, however, that a reporter's interest in being present at
the proceeding may still be protected by the First Amendment because
he acts as an agent for the public.69 The Court in Press-Enterprise noted
that this consititutional protection is not absolute. It is limited by the
defendant's right to a fair trial, as well as the needs of government to
obtain properly adjudicated convictions and the need to preserve the con-
fidentiality of sensitive information such as the identity of informants.7"
The bottom line is that the Court's decision is problematic in that it
fails to articulate parameters and provide examples of when such a quali-
fied right would be overcome by some other compelling interest asserted
by the defendant, the State or Federal Government, a witness or victim,
or even possibly third parties who are not parties to a given action.
Therefore, when confronted with such motions for closure, the newspa-
per will have to contest these motions just as it did prior to bringing their
case before the United State Supreme Court. These issues will continue
to be decided on a case by case basis, something the newspaper, no doubt,
was hoping to avoid.
Another aspect of this case which the Court failed to examine fully
was the conflict of rights between the accused who wanted closure, and
the public wanting access, which is due to the inherent conflict between
the Sixth and First Amendments. The Court evaded a Sixth Amendment
66. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. at 2744.
67. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 384.
68. Id. at 391.
69. Id. at 392.
70. Press-Enterprise, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2743 (1986).
1988]
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discussion, denying its applicability in this case by concluding that be-
cause the accused requested a closed hearing, he was not exercising his
Sixth Amendment rights.71
The Court may have been inaccurate in concluding that the accused
was not exercising his Sixth Amendment rights. This is because the
Sixth Amendment guarantees other rights besides a public trial, such as
the rights to notice, confrontation of witnesses and compulsory process.72
It is doubtful that the defendant waived all of these rights just because he
requested a closed hearing.
The conflict is apparent when the defendant fails to exercise all of
his rights under the Sixth Amendment and the public is asserting its
rights under the First Amendment. The Court has uniformly recognized
the guarantee of a public trial as one created for the benefit of the ac-
cused.73 However, the Court has also recognized that although the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the defendant's right to a public trial in a crimi-
nal case, it does not guarantee the right to compel a private trial solely
upon the accused's request.74 It is because of this inherent conflict of
rights under these Amendments that the Court set forth certain criteria
to resolve the conflict by balancing the interests involved.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT FACES THIS RECURRING PROBLEM
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed similar issues
regarding closure confirming earlier indications that these cases are likely
to recur. For example, in United States v. Brooklier,7" the court held that
the First Amendment right to access applies to pretrial suppression hear-
ings. The court recognized the occasional conflict between the public's
First Amendment right of access and the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial. Therefore, the court articulated its requirement that
the party seeking closure of proceedings or sealing of documents must
establish that the closure "is strictly necessary in order to protect the fair
71. Id. at 2740.
72. U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides, in full that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
73. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 380.
74. Id. at 382.
75. 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
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trial guarantee." 76
To meet this burden, the court required satisfaction of three sub-
stantive tests. First, there must be a substantial probability that irrepara-
ble damage to the defendant's right to a fair trial will result without
closure. Second, there must be a substantial probability that alternatives
to closure will not adequately protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Third, there must be a substantial probability that closure will effectively
protect against the perceived harm.7 7
In addition, the court stated two procedural prerequisites to ob-
taining an order which closes a criminal proceeding to the public.7 8
First, those excluded from the proceeding must be allowed a reasonable
opportunity to have their objections be heard. Second, the reasons sup-
porting closure must be articulated in the findings issued by the trial
court.7 9
A second example of a closure case, Associated Press v. United States
District Court, involved John DeLorean's indictment.8 " This case dealt
with the district court's order that future filings of documents would be
closed to the public's access until the court initially reviewed them. The
court, acting sua sponte, wanted to protect DeLorean's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial since the case was receiving substantial media
attention.8'
The Associated Press, the Los Angeles Herald Examiner and several
other news organizations petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order.
The court of appeals issued the writ holding that the district court had
failed to pass any of the substantive tests as required by Brooklier.82 The
court of appeals concluded that the district court issued this order with-
out any notice or opportunity to be heard by either the parties involved,
the media or the public. 3 In addition, the order was not based on any
findings indicated by the district court.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the newspaper in Press-Enterprise did not
76. Id. at 1167.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983).
81. Id. at 1145.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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accomplish what it intended when it appealed its case to the United
States Supreme Court. By qualifying the newspaper's right of access, the
Court placed certain restrictions and conditions upon this right. This
involves evaluating the defendant's right to a fair trial under the Sixth
Amendment (or a witness' or victim's need to testify in a closed proceed-
ing), and balancing these rights against the public or newspaper's right of
access to criminal hearings under the First Amendment. Because the
Court placed a stricter standard upon the moving party (or the court if it
acts sua sponte), the newspaper may be more likely to prevail in a given
action. However, closure orders will still be contested and due to the
nature of the rights involved, the courts will have to make determinations
regarding the rights of the parties involved on a case by case basis.
Steven D. Karbelnig
